The Trial of Guenter Deckert
By Sylvia Stolz
Translated from the German language
by Christine Miller
‘A prison sentence will not force me into believing.’
~ Guenter Deckert
‘When I have doubts I demand the right to express them …They talk about tolerance, but mean the inquisition. … The hunt to find incorrect literature pretending to fight crime. For a short time people can be intimidated by the threat of punishment, but the brain continues to reason.’
Guenter Deckert1 copy
Thus spoke Guenter Deckert in his final comment at his sentencing February, 2012 in front of the state court Mannheim. The report of his trial follows.
Since January 2, 2013 Guenter has been in prison on account of aiding and abetting so-called Holocaust denial. We accompanied him on his journey to prison and took leave of him at the Mannheim prison gate.
We expressed our thanks for his courage and his commitment to freedom, justice and truth. We will always remember that. The day will come when the Germans and other people will appreciate his zeal.
He is supposed to be released May 2013. We will be there waiting for him starting at nine o’clock.
Address: Herzogenriedstrasse 111, 68169 Mannheim. Whoever wants to be there and greet him is cordially invited.
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The Opinion Terror
By Sylvia Stolz
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A prison sentence for doubting the ‘Holocaust.’
No probation for expressing one’s opinion in these times of alleged ‘right wing terror.’
In these times of the ‘resurfacing’ of right wing extremism which, without question, is due to the criminal deeds of the alleged ‘NSU’, Holocaust denial constitutes a considerable danger for public peace.
Guenter Deckert, former high school teacher, on February 2, 2012 was sentenced by the state court of Mannheim to a prison sentence of six months without probation on account of aiding and abetting so-called Holocaust denial. As well, because of the ‘radical’ law and in spite of high evaluations he was dismissed from his high school teaching job in November, 1988 in the State of Baden-Wuertenberg and was denied his pension.
He is charged with having cooperated in the translation into German of the book by Carlo Mattogno, Auschwitz the First Gassings, Rumors and Reality (December, Castle Hill Publishers.)
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On July 28, 2010 Guenter Deckert had been sentenced by the lower court of Weinheim to a prison term of 4 months with probation. The charges were: promotion of incitement of the public by means of Holocaust denial and defamation of the memory of the dead. (&&130 III, IV, 189 STGB-BRD. Aktenzeichen: 2Ds 503 Js 14219/08 AK 579/09).
The prosecutor appealed and on February 2, 2012 the sentence by the state court of Mannheim was increased to six months without probation. Guenter Deckert’s appeal was thrown out (Aktenzeichen: 12Ns 503 Js 14219/08)
Many people in the BRD (Germany), the BRO (Austria), Switzerland, France, Spain, Greece and other countries have been sentenced because they denied or doubted the Holocaust when defined as systematic genocide. At times very high prison sentences have been handed down. For example the sentence against lawyer Horst Mahler.
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The Holocaust is not defined
During his appeal Guenter Deckert wanted to know the concrete facts which he, according to the accusations, deliberately ignored and the truth he contested. He received no answer.
It is especially telling that the so-called ‘Holocaust’ is not legally defined (This is against the principal of the penal law). In the first trial no concrete facts as to the place of the crime, the methods of killing or other proofs, directly or indirectly presented in the findings of other trials, were presented.
Concerning his denial the court pointed to &130 section 3StGB , &6 section of the international penal law which defines genocide as being when a member of an ethnic or religious group is killed with the intent to destroy or partially destroy the whole group. According to &130 section 3StGB i.V.m &6 section VStGB people can be punished who deny that under the rule of National Socialism, without knowledge or intent of the German Reichsregierung, a Jew, by someone or another (even by a none German), had been killed with the intent to partially destroy Jewry as an ethnic and religious group.
‘Known to the court’ to be challenged’
Guenter Deckert at the beginning of his appeal made the following motion:
‘I move for the court to discuss point by point the principles on which the court rests its ‘known to the court’ facts which, since the beginning of the Seventies of the Twentieth Century, generally go under the notation ‘Holocaust.’
The court should establish if and how far the persons who are called to judge have knowledge of these ‘facts’ or only base their judgment on hearsay or secondary literature.’
Before coming to a decision about this motion the court should take into consideration the resolution by the petition caucus of the German Bundestag (upper house) Pet 12-4-07-45-5699 Deutscher Bundestag 12. election period print 12/2849.
An excerpt: During a main trial the court is duty bound to discuss those facts of which the court has taken judicial notice in order to give the accused the opportunity to contest them. In addition it has to be acknowledged that ‘known to the court’ does need to exist in perpetuity or has to remain unchanged. New information might have been gotten and new events might have happened which will bring about a different conclusion. If the accused presents such circumstances which in the past have not been mentioned or discussed the ‘known to the court’ can be challenged and new proofs concerning these facts have to be considered. In this way the accused and his defender have the possibility to counter ‘it is known to the court.’
The decision concerning ‘it is ‘known to the court’ & 244 lies therefore exclusively in the hands of the court in question and is subject to the principle of independence in respect to judges. It is also possible that in individual cases a different judgment may be the result.’
Judgment based on the media
Concerning ‘it is known to the court’ the following decisions have been made: (…)
The county court Bernau presided over by the female judge Kroh rejected the motion to discuss the principles of ‘known to the court,’ stating that the facts and the legal situation were the same. She simply gave judicial notice that during the National Socialist (NS) period, the genocide of the Jews in gas chambers located in the concentration camps happened.
The 3. Senate of the Bavarian state court rejected the motion concerning ‘the Holocaust is a fact, known to the court’ with the pronouncement that it does not have any doubts as to the reality of the Holocaust, referring to the accessible and common information in words, pictures, and sound. (decision 1/14/2011, Bay AGH II 27/09). The motion of the defense to challenge which material the senate based its certainty of ‘known to the court’ was denied citing material in newspapers, on TV, in reference and history books (decision 2/8/2011).
The judiciary degrades itself to a grotesque caricature if it bases its judgments on the media and TV. Judiciary contains the word justice. It does not deserve its name.
No actual facts
It is worthy of notice that the so-called Holocaust is not legally defined and facts are avoided. In & 130 StGB-BRD which is used to convict ‘Holocaust deniers’ the so-called Holocaust is not defined. It is not even mentioned.
The sentencing of Guenter Deckert in the first instance at the local court in Weinheim contains no determination of the crime of ‘Holocaust denial’. In other words there is no determination of the Holocaust in regard to the place of the crime, the methods of killing, the number of the dead, the time frame, the perpetrators, the bodies, no deposition taken of the witnesses, no proof of the intent by National Socialism to completely or partially exterminate the Jews. There is no determination about decisions, planes, orders or documents not even in the form of references to other judicial sentences.
In addition there is no determination of the knowledge the accused had, or is supposed to have had, or must have had, or could have had.
As long as the courts do not name the location on which the mass murder was suppose to have happened; as long as the courts do not describe how the killing was done; as long as the courts do not mention any proofs; a judgment that mass murder has occurred is not possible. The same is the case for ‘it is known to the court.’
Without submitting proof as to actual facts a sentencing for Holocaust denial is not valid.
Without the determination of what knowledge of the so-called Holocaust the accused had or could have had, the charge that he acted against his better knowledge is void.
If the above mentioned points are not addressed a sentencing for the denial of the Holocaust is arbitrary and a corruption of the law.
A defense is not possible
The refusal by the judiciary to bring up for discussion the principle of ‘it is known to the court that the holocaust happened’ makes any defense impossible. Not knowing the concrete facts on which the accusation is based emasculates the defense. The law used to sentence an accused without the defense being able to challenge ‘it is known to the court’ defeats the ends of the law.
‘The Holocaust as fact is known to the court.’ Which facts however the court knows are not stated.
For example: Dr. Martin Broszart, director for the federal Institute fuer Zeitgeschichte published the following: ‘Neither in Dachau, nor in Bergen-Belsen, nor in Buchenwald were Jews or other inmates gassed.’ (Die Zeit, 8/19/1960, p 16). On the other hand there are publications which talk about the gassings in Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald. Which of the two is, according to the judiciary, ‘…known to the court?’ Is it ‘known to the court’ that inmates were gassed at Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald, or is it ‘… known to the court’ that nobody was gassed at Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald? Both cannot be ‘… known to the court.’
An entire event such as the so-called ‘Holocaust’ can only be undisputed (facts known to the court) when the individual events are undisputed (facts known to the court).
The history Professor Dr. Gerhard Jagschitz of the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of Vienna wrote the following expert opinion: ‘Substantial doubts about the trials in question have been raised by the presentation of expert opinions to national and international courts. The relentless repetition of judgments using ‘ facts known to the court,’ namely that the Jews were killed by gas in the concentration camp of Auschwitz, will not be enough on which to base sentencing in a democratic nation which is supposed to be founded on justice and right.’ (letter to the state court Vienna, 1/10/l991, AZ:26b Vr 14 184/86)
The Ruhr Nachrichten (Bochum) No. 277 (11/29/2005) printed a citation by the Israeli writer and musician Gilad Atzmon: ‘The historiography known to us about WWII and the Holocaust is a complete falsification initiated by the Americans and Zionists.’
Is the Holocaust indisputably ‘a fact known to the court’ or is it indisputably ‘a fact known to the court’ that the Holocaust is frequently challenged and therefore can not be ‘a fact known to the court?’
It is therefore illogical to call a certain alleged historical event which is frequently contested as ‘a fact known to the court’, a concept which the authorities then use to persecute and penalize the ‘deniers.’
Abuse of procedural rights
After reading the motion Guenter Deckert wanted to know what he has to accept as ‘facts known to the court.’ The prosecutor, Andreas Grossmann replied (11/14). ‘That you will find out during sentencing.’ During the sentencing however nothing was said.
The chairman, Ross, decreed to postpone the decision concerning the motion. He said: first principles have to be established. Prosecutor Grossmann remarked (January 13, 2012) that the motion only will be dealt with after the pleading. The purpose became obvious when (January 13, 2012) the motion was denied. In the meantime Guenter Deckert took up his case again. In order to show that the ‘facts are known to the court’ must be fully discussed he described in detail circumstances and facts which made him doubt the ‘Holocaust.’ For example he mentioned Dr. Benedikt Kautzky who, for seven years, was in German concentration camps among others, in Auschwitz-Birkenau, and who wrote that in no camp did he ever see a gas chamber.
The chamber denied the motion to discuss ‘facts are known to the court‘ (chairman Roos, jurors-Wolfgang W. and Helmut M.) using, among other arguments, the reason, ‘the Holocaust defined as mass killings of Jews especially in the gas chambers of the concentration camps during WWII is ‘a fact known to the court’ (January 13, 2012). The Holocaust as historical event is considering evidence beyond discussion.’
‘The facts are known to the court’ is not to be discussed because ‘the facts are known to the court’ is a circular argument incompatible with logic and beyond reason and the principles of justice.
The resolution goes on to accuse Guenter Deckert of abusing procedural rights. The need for proofs is not applicable since Guenter Deckert’s demands in that regard, during the main trial, are only designed to involve the court in order to spread his revisionist ideas. This is obvious from his presentation in which he declared that ‘facts known to the court’ needs to be discussed.
According to the court it is an abuse of the justice system when an accused, before being sentenced, tries to move the court to examine the facts of which he is accused.
The resolution furthermore implies that the chamber considers the discussion which forms the basis of the accusation as ‘court research’ to which the accused is not entitled.
The court in this resolution has obviously ignored the laws of reason.
On one hand the court looks at the motion to discuss ‘the Holocaust, a fact known to the court’ (contrary to what Guenter Deckert has said) as a move for proof, on the other hand, in contradiction to this, as a motion to obtain ‘court research’. The motion however implies neither one nor the other.
Historical facts are deliberately ignored
The resolution further states that Guenter Deckert deliberately ignores historical facts and obstinately refuses to accept the truth.
Reacting to the resolution (January 13, 2012) Guenter Deckert moved (February 2, 2012) that the chamber communicate the following:
According to the court’s knowledge ‘the ‘Holocaust’ is a fact’ in which concentration camps and gas chambers existed.
According to the court’s knowledge in what ways did additional killings take place?
According to its knowledge what were the number of victims?
According to the court’s opinion which facts of the so-called Holocaust have I ignored and accepted?
Since the prosecutor and the court have not produced any facts in regard to the accusation I cannot know which facts I supposedly ignore.
I made the motion to discuss the principles of the ‘Holocaust is a fact known to the court’ in order to be able to defend myself against the accusation of Holocaust denial. I stated in detail that the court is duty bound to discuss their determination that the ‘Holocaust is a fact known to the court.’
In addition I have pointed out that there is no concrete definition of the so-called Holocaust.
Furthermore no determination has been made about which knowledge of the so-called Holocaust I had or was supposed to have had or could have had.
In the resolution of January 13, 2012 the so-called decision does not contain any determination to the circumstances and ‘it is known to the court,’ nor are there any references.
Without defining the deed in question a sentencing for Holocaust denial is not possible.
Without determining which concrete knowledge the accused had about the so called ‘Holocaust’, or could have had, an accusation to have acted against his better knowledge is void, and therefore a sentencing for denying the truth is not possible.
What is ‘fact known to the court’
During my argument I presented facts which show that there is a need for a discussion about ‘fact known to the court.’
‘Known to the court’ are historical facts which by means of historical research are considered proven and everybody therefore without specific knowledge can inform himself from history books, encyclopedia and similar reference books (Alsberg/Nuesse/Meyer, proof in a trial, 5. edition, Carl Heymanns publishing house, Berlin 1983, p.539.
The acceptance of ‘the fact is known to the court’ rests on the preliminary condition that the fact is not challenged (vglAlsber/Nuesse/meyer, a.a.O., p. 568.
If however in historiography the truth of an event is contested it does not become accepted knowledge just because much has been written about it and disseminated (Alsberg/Nuesse/Meyer, a.a.O.,P. 540).
In my motion to discuss ‘the Holocaust happened is known to the court’ I cited examples of publications, especially non revisionist publications which prove that the Holocaust historiography is not in agreement, does not speak with one voice, is not unchallenged, and contradicts itself. The Holocaust therefore cannot be claimed as ‘a fact known to the court.’
A sentencing for denying the Holocaust on the basis of ‘the Holocaust is known to the court’ is therefore not possible. I made the motion not in order to spread revisionism, as maintained by the chamber, but for the simple reason that I have been accused of Holocaust denial and that I want to use my right to defend myself.
To dismiss my motion because I intended for the court to deal with ‘the Holocaust is known to the court’ is arbitrary. Before sentencing it is an essential duty and the task of the court to deal with the underlying facts.
It is factually and judicially not understandable why in a trial for Holocaust denial a motion is supposed to be abusive which is meant to bring clarity in regard to ‘a fact known to the court.’
‘Fact known to the court’ is in need of discussion
When a French historian, Jacques Baynac, a proponent of the Holocaust writes that for the existence of the Nazi gas chambers only the lack of documents, traces and other material proofs can be confirmed (Le Noveau Quotidien de Lausanne, Switzerland , September 2, l996, p.16 and September 3/l996, p.14) then this means that there is a need to discuss ‘the Holocaust is known to the court.’
Michel de Bouaerd, professor for history and dean of the faculty for the Arts and Sciences at the University of Caen (Normandy) states that the documentation concerning the Holocaust is rotten, that the documentation about the system of the German concentration camps is permeated by a mass of invented stories, relentless repetitions of falsifications, especially in regard to numbers, and confusion and generalizations (Ouest-France v. 2-3 August l986, p. 6). This again proves that there is a need to discuss ‘the Holocaust is known to the court.’
Historian Professor Ernst Nolte seconds the need for a discussion of ‘fact known to the court. ‘The testimony of witnesses rests to a large part on hearsay and mere surmises; the testimony of the few eyewitness are in part contradictory and create doubts in regard to their veracity.’
The director of the Yad Vashem memorial, Shmuel Krakowski, in the same vain states (Jerusalem Post, August 17, l986): ‘Most of the 20,000 witnesses’ testimony concerning the Holocaust are unbelievable, falsified, cannot be verified, or in other ways are not true.’
On January 13, 2012 during a pause in the proceedings (around 16:30) the chairman Ross directed the following words to me: ‘You would be surprised at the knowledge of history by the jurors.’ But judges have to make an unencumbered decision, based on their conviction which they formed during the proceedings in question (& 261 StPO). In addition ‘facts known to the court’ in order to be useable have to be introduced during the main trial in order to give the participants the opportunity to take a position.
It would therefore be useful if the members of the chamber would reveal their knowledge of history to the accused before they convict him on the basis of this knowledge.
If not it will remain obscure on which facts the members of chamber base their views. It (the Holocaust) is supposed to be a wrong removed from common categories and therefore &130 StGB is an exception to the prohibition of having a special law. (motion of cessation of the trial on account of the special law & 130 which is contrary to the German basic law. The motion was denied January 13, 2012)
The chamber misrepresents my motion. It considers it a motion for proof which is obvious from their choice of words. ‘The chamber is supposed to furnish proof,’ ‘makes proof unnecessary.’ ‘proof is also inadmissible,’ ‘a motion for proof is inadmissible (p.2 of the resolution).’
But it is unequivocally clear that the motion was not a motion for proof.
The motion to discuss the principle of ‘the Holocaust, a fact known to the court’ does not mean, that the Holocaust did not happen (p. 2 of the resolution), but was a motion to examine the facts on which ‘fact known to the court’ are based.
The chamber maintains that I contested ‘facts known to the court.’ The chamber is mistaken. I did not contest facts, but demanded the discussion of facts.
What is a circular argument?
A circular argument is to deny the motion for discussion of the principle of ‘fact known to the court’ with the argument that a discussion is not necessary since the Holocaust is ‘a fact known to the court.’ (p.2 of the resolution.)
The chamber misunderstands not only the meaning of a ‘circular argument,’ but also the concept of ‘an established fact known to the court.’ What is frequently contested can’t be ‘an established fact known to the court’ since ‘an established fact known to the court’ is defined as undisputed, unchallenged (see above).
It is a circular argument if I would say ‘the holocaust is not ‘a fact known to the court’ because ‘it is not known to the court.’ It is, however, not a circular argument if I say: ‘the Holocaust is not fact known to the court’ because ‘known to the court’ is equivalent to conformity and indisputability. The historiography of the Holocaust is not in conformity and is not unchallenged. The resolution stated by the chamber shows a lack of capacity to reason.
It is inconsequential if it happened or not
My motion of January 13, 2012 in which I stated that the incriminating book is scientifically correct was denied. The following reason was given: It does not matter if the book is scientifically correct. I am guilty since I assisted in the formation of the book.
It looks as if the chamber agrees with the view of the Mannheim court who convicted Ernst Zuendel. ‘It does not matter if the Holocaust did or did not take place.’ The ‘tageszeitung (February 9, 2007, p.6)’ writes about the Zuendel trial: ‘At the end the court denied all the motions with the lapidary reason (a shock to some of the antifascists among the audience): ‘It does not matter one wit if the Holocaust did or did not take place. Its denial is punishable under German law. Only this is what counts.’
It is a strange concept of justice and the law, namely, to convict somebody on account of Holocaust denial because it does not matter if or if not the Holocaust took place. It disregards all the principles underlying right and justice. The federal court promoting this view does not make it right and changes nothing.
The chamber appears to arbitrarily use a formulary in order to avoid having to bother with analyzing the arguments of the defense.
Up to now it is obvious that the chamber abuses ‘procedural rights’ with goals which have nothing to do with the trial. It feigns an interest in the truth, but uses the law for a nefarious purpose.
Even if a falsehood is repeated a thousand times, it does not turn it into the truth.
This motion was denied using as justification the argument that the court has no duty to communicate, and no duty to clarify. The motion to communicate was denied even in regard to the fairness of the trial.
Contrary to the basic law
Guenter Deckert, at the beginning of his appeal (November 14, 2012), moved to postpone the trial until the federal court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) had made a decision in so far as &130 Abs. 3 StGB conforms to the Basic Law, especially Art. 5 GG (freedom of opinion) and Art. 103 Abs. 2GG.
Doubting or contesting the Holocaust is, according to the new principles laid down by the BVerfG, not punishable (1BvR 2150/08 V. November 4, 2009).
In as far as the chamber is convinced that &130 Abs. 3StGb does not agree with the interpretation of the Basic Law concerning the ‘denial’ and the down playing of the Holocaust, the chamber should postpone the trial and await the decision of the Federal Court.
In the meantime, according to posted principles of the BVerfG, punishment for denial or down playing of the Holocaust is not congruent with Art. 5 GGand Art. 103 Abs. 2GG. This can be deduced from the decision 1BvR 2150/09 (November 4, 2009)
This decision in regard to &130 Abs. 4StGB came about on account of a Basic Law complaint by the deceased lawyer Juergen Rieger against the prohibition of a memorial march for Rudolf Hess in Wunsiedel. It contains basic principles which effect &130 Abs. 3StGB.
In the above mentioned decision the promulgated principles are not only important for &130 Abs.4StGB but also for &130 Abs. 3StGB. This can be surmised by the explanation of the 1. Senate of the BVerfG which is meant to clarify the law concerning the expression of opinions and therefore is all around binding. Due to the death of the plaintiff (Juergen Rieger) the 1. Senate did not see it to the end and did not make use of its possibility to discontinue the trial.
Opinions which doubt or contest the truth of the so-called Holocaust are, according to recently determined principles of the BVerfG, not punishable.
The 1.Senate emphasized in the above mentioned decision that the prohibition concerning a special law has to be universally valid and has to extend to all opinion limiting laws (Abs.- Nr.63).
It states that a special law is indicated if it leads to a connection with an opinion limiting law concerning ‘certain historical interpretation of events.’ That definitely applies to &130 Abs. 3 StGB.
The Senate of the BVerfG determined that special laws are laws which do not limit the freedom of opinion concerning historical reigns of terror, but only limit themselves to a reign of terror of a special kind; explicitly named is the National Socialist regime.
Since Art, 5Abs. 2GG does not allow for special laws concerning the limitation of freedom of opinion, but only general laws, special laws are not in agreement with the Basic Law.
For this reason the 1.Senate of the BVerfG determined &130Abs. 4StGB to be a special law as an exception which is nevertheless in agreement with Art. 5 Abs. 1 and 2 GG, since & 4StGB puts limits on the approval of the historical National Socialist reign of terror and despotism (lead sentence Nr. 1), but does not penalize anybody who minimizes the ideology of National Socialism or has an objectionable historical interpretation of that time.
Denial is not punishable
The 1. Senate considers &130 Abs.4 StGB, in spite of it being a special law, in agreement with the basic law since its judicial value is similar to &140 StGB which heavily punishes anybody who rewards or approves certain factual events (Abs.-Nr. 82). In this way it demarcates &130 Abs. 4 from &130 Abs 3 StGB in as far as &130 Abs. 3StGB, contrary to &130 Abs. 4 StGB, penalizes not only approbation, but also denial or disparagement.
The 1 Senate of the BVerfG emphasized that &139 Abs. 4StGB as special law can not be based on the right to personal honor according to Art. 5 Abs. 2 alternative 3GG referring here to the dignity of the victims. In regard to the general public the requirement of opinion limiting laws according to Art. 5 Abs. 2 alternative 1 GG extends to the protection of honor. Therefore the same is valid for & 130 Abs. 3StGB. Since this is a special law it can not be based on the right to personal honor or the personal dignity of the victims in as far as it extends to the punishment on account of denial or diminishment.
The 1 Senate in its decision states that it is ‘critical’ of the literature dealing with penalties concerning the disturbance of the public peace and refers among others to the BGH judge and StGB commentator Thomas Fischer (Abs.-Nr 93). The Senate unequivocally states that the expression ‘Public Peace’ meaning interests worth protecting has to apply universally to rules in regard to offensive opinions. It makes a point to emphasize that the paragraph: ‘incitement of the public’ (&130 Abs. 1 to 3 StGB’ (Abs.-Nr. 78) also covers the other infractions.
In reference to the protection of the public peace &130 Abs. 4 StGB also contained in &130 Abs. 3StGB the 1. Senate of the BVerfG declared following:
‘The concept of public peace which intends to protect the citizens from being confronted with provocative opinions and ideologies does not justify the interference with the freedom of opinion even if the consequences might be dangerous and even if they propose a radical change of the present valid order. A free nation has to be able to cope with freedom of opinion. To protect the citizens from having their feeling for peace and harmony disturbed, or the poisoning of the mental climate, or a wrong interpretation of history does not justify an intervention.’ (Abs.-Nr.77)
In as far as &130 Abs. StGB penalizes the down playing or denial of the so-called ‘Holocaust’ it does not support a basis to threaten punishment. It is therefore dissimilar to &130 Abs.4 StGB which penalizes the APPROVAL of criminal offenses.
According to & 130 Abs. 3 StGb, not only the approval and approbation, but also the denial and downplaying should be punishable, is not congruent with the Basic Law.
In this connection it is meaningful that the Spanish constitutional court on November 2007, in regard to a suit brought by the Spanish publisher Pedro Varela, invalidated the order which penalized the denial of the so-called Holocaust, but exempted approval.
On September 2, 2009 the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal judge, Athanasios D. Hadjis, declared in the case of Warman v Lemire: The prohibition against Holocaust denial is against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The attempt by the Italian parliament to push through a law similar to &130 Abs. 3 StGB was not successful.
In 2008 the pensioned judges Hoffmann-Riem and Hassemer of the German Federal Court took a critical stand in regard to penalizing Holocaust denial. The daily paper ‘Der Tagesspiegel (July 10, 2008) commented on Hoffmann-Riem’s opinion: ‘The Federal Court, according to Hoffmann-Riem, has up to now not engaged itself with the punitive illegality of Holocaust denial. But it is possible that in the future there could be a new basic decision.’
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (March 4, 2010) p. 4 writes: ‘Shortly after his retirement from the Federal Court Hoffmann-Riem said: ‘As a lawgiver I would not penalize Holocaust denial.’’
In the charge against the accused (Guenter Deckert) there is not a hint that he would have approved of a Jewish genocide or that he would have approved of a ‘Holocaust’ or any other crime.
According to the above mentioned decision by the federal court the trial should be suspended. A false interpretation of history, or an offensive interpretation of those times (the Nazi period) in contrast to approval has no basis in the law to curtail freedom of opinion.
No attempt to prove exceptional crimes
In spite of this decision there were more convictions on account of so called ‘Holocaust denial.’ It is obvious that some judges interpret that decision at will.
In as far as the Federal Court speaks of the ‘unique crimes’ of the historical National Socialist regime (BVerfG a.a. O.,s.B. Abs.-Nr. 68) denial of the ‘Holocaust’ does not mean its approval nor does it lead to endangerment of law and order. Even a ‘unique crime’ does not make the provision of proof superfluous.
Denial does not mean approval
It is telling that the BVerfG does not make a difference between approval of the so called ‘Holocaust and the approval of the National Socialist regime but without any ado throws ‘Holocaust and the reign of the historical nationalist reign of terror into one pot without mentioning the one and defining the other.’
The approval of the National Socialist regime in the conviction that it had not committed mass murder of the Jews is equated with the approval of the so called ‘historical reign of terror’ which is quietly equated with the approval of the ’Holocaust.’
Cleverly they leave out this muddling. They try to make it disappear in a fog of generalizations.
They manipulate in the attempt to justify the persecution of ‘Holocaust denial.’ Without producing concrete facts or proofs they accept, as an unquestionable fact, that the historical National Socialist regime committed crimes. They try (in vain) to justify as lawful that raising counter proofs merits punishment.
Special Status for the BRD (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
The Federal Court tries to make us believe that the BRD can legislate special laws as &130 StGB (punishment of a certain opinion which includes the prohibition of presenting proofs for the defense because the historical identity of the BRD is a ‘reverse mirror image of National Socialism’ (BVerfG a.a. O., Abs.-Nr. 66). In other words, because the BRD is the BRD.
The arbitrariness (despotism) can not be expressed more succinctly.
The decision of the 1. Senate of the BVerfG does not mention any concrete facts or any court verdict on which it bases its conviction that the historical National Socialist regime was a regime of terror and despotism. The so-called court judgment of the BGH (Abs.-Nr.100) does not name concrete facts or events.
The Spiegel author, Goetz Aly, reports that 95% of Germans did not look at the National Socialist system as a system which suppressed freedom and ruled by terror, but as a system promoting social warmth a feel-good dictatorship. (Spiegel Nr.10/2005, p. 56). Again the Spiegel: Even in the year l948 app. 57% of Germans thought that National Socialism had been a good idea (Nr. 20/2003, p.47).
Revealing is the reference regarding the reasons of the allied victorious powers which the 1. Senate states in connection with the identity of the BRD (Abs. Nr. 65, 66). The final conquering of National Socialist structures and the prevention of their resurrection was the main reason of the Allies to reestablish German statehood. (Abs.-Nr. 65).
In this connection it is interesting what Wendell Willkie, special envoy of US President Roosevelt writes about his negotiations with Stalin, namely that the first aim of the war should be the ‘Abolition of racial exclusiveness.’ (W.L. Willkie: ‘One World’, Simon&Schuster, New York, l943 published in the FAZ, February 4, 1992).
The historian Prof. Christian Meier (University Munich), questioned by the publication ‘Der Spiegel’: ‘How do you explain that the national pride of the Germans was so effectively broken?’ had this to say: ‘The totality of the defeat and the collective shame about Auschwitz.’ (‘Der Spiegel’ Nr 30/2010, July 26, 2010, p. 126).
‘Die Welt’ (November 20, 1982) cites Walter Lippmann, chief of the unofficial propaganda ministry under President Woodrow Wilson, in the twentieth to fiftieth year of the past century and one of the most influential journalists in the USA: ‘To secure the victory, beside the necessary occupation of the enemy nation and the sentencing of the elite in war crime trials, it is most important to impose on the conquered a re-education program. The means are: to implant into the brains of the conquered the presentation of history from the viewpoint of the victors. It is important to transfer the moral categories of the war propaganda into the consciousness of the vanquished. When the war propaganda of the victors is written up in the history books of the vanquished and is believed by the successive generation only then can re-education be looked upon as having been a success.’
The Historian, Prof. Dr. Ernst Nolte, said this: If the radical revisionism is right insisting that there was no holocaust in the sense of an all encompassing, systematic genocide wanted by the top echelon then I would have to admit that National Socialism was not a fun house mirror copy of Bolshevism, but only a fight for survival by a Germany pushed into a worldwide political defensive. (Ernst Nolte, Francois Furet, Feindliche Naehe, Herbig, Munich l998, p. 222-224).
In l994 Patrick Bahners, who later became Feuilleton chief of the FAZ, made this comment regarding the trial of so-called ‘Holocaust denier’ Guenter Deckert: If Guenter Deckert’s belief about the ‘Holocaust’ is correct then the Federal Republic would be founded on a lie; every presidential speech would be a lie, every minute of silence and every history book would be all lies. In as far as he denies the genocide of the Jews he contests the legitimacy of the Federal Republic. (‘Objective suicide’, FAZ , August 15, 1994)
It is obvious that there is no legitimate basis to punish ‘denial of the Holocaust’
This motion was rebuffed. In its reasoning the chamber confirmed that 2 and 3 of &130 StGB-BRD is not a general law, but a special law. But an exception had to be made in regard to the prohibition of a special law. The reasoning: a special law is legitimate on account of the injustices and horrors of the National Socialist regime which were beyond all categories and which involved Europe and many parts of the world (decision January 13, 2012; replica of the 1.lead sentence of the BVerfGE 11/4/2009, 1BvR 2150/2008).
With this decision the BVerfG claims that the Holocaust is not to be judged according to general categories. That means the interpretation concerning the Holocaust is outside of the law.
It is a clear case of despotism when proof is superfluous and even declared punishable because it deals with a singular crime.
It is noteworthy what prosecutor Grossman, off the cuff, said about the motion: ‘We interpret the decision of the BVerfGE not the way you interpret it.’ … &130 needs to be interpreted?! The wording of &130 is not understandable?!
Science does not matter
Guenter Deckert moved to get the expert opinion of an historian to prove that Carlo Mattogno’s book ‘Auschwitz-the First Gassing, Rumors and Reality’ is scientifically correct.
The motion was denied: ‘Not only the professional judge, but also the two lay judges have enough expertise in order to judge the problem in question.’
Revealing is the further explanation of the chamber: The scientific proof of the incriminating book is in regard to the court decision ‘meaningless.’ In judging the defendant it is irrelevant, even if one holds the opinion that the publication is scientifically correct. To have assisted in the translation of the book and its final revision by the defendant, the defendant committed an offense of incitement or assisting in the incitement of the public. The demand for proof is not applicable in regard to &&130 Abs. i.V.m. 86 Abs. 3 StGB (social adequacy clause) since the format of the case does not apply here.
In other words: It does not matter if the incriminating book is scientifically correct. Assisting in the formation of the book has to be punished.
Finally, Guenter Deckert rejected the judges due to bias giving following reason (January 3, 2012):
The denial of my motion of November 14, 2011, pronounced today to discuss the principles of ‘facts know to the court’ of the so-called Holocaust is worrisome because the lay judges let themselves be guided by foreign interests instead of facts and take a position which can not be squared with their duty to impartiality.
The denial of my motion gives the impression that the lay judges conducted the trial with a goal in mind and do not look at facts with the necessary distance of the impartial.
Rejecting my motion the lay judges rejected the necessary elucidation of the facts before pronouncing a conviction.
In my motion to discuss ‘manifest obviousness’ of the so called ‘Holocaust’ I pointed out that the judgment of the first instance does not contain any facts in regard to the so-called Holocaust’ not even in regard to other court decisions.
The decision in the first instance points to numerous passages of the incriminating book by Carlos Mattogno which deny, in defiance of the law, the historically established fact of the Holocaust of the Jews, respectively the gassing crimes in Auschwitz. The first instance however does not discuss or confirm any proofs that Auschwitz was the actual place where the genocide occurred. No historical source is mentioned which would allow for informing a person about the legally binding ‘historically established Holocaust.’
Without actual determination of the deed a conviction for truth rejecting denial of the deed is not possible and legally not tenable.
Without determination, which concrete knowledge about the so-called ‘Holocaust’ the accused had or at least could have had, a verdict having acted against his better knowledge is not legal.
An unbiased judge would take that in to consideration and not deny the discussion of ‘Holocaust, a manifest obviousness.’
In order to counter the accusation of so-called ‘Holocaust denial’ I moved to have a discussion of the principles underlying ‘Holocaust, a manifest obviousness.’
As long as the lay judges give judicial notice that the ‘Holocaust’ is ‘a manifest obviousness’ I am not able to give concrete proofs on my behalf. In this way the lay judges deny me the right to a legal hearing (Art 103 ll GG) and give cause to a worrisome prejudice.
In addition it is contradictory to sentence or to confirm that a truth rejecting denial took place, and at the same time deny proof of the deed.
Judgment according to political correctness
The necessity to discuss the principles of ‘manifest obviousness’ is a given on account of numerous statements which put ‘manifest obviousness’ in doubt. ‘Manifest obviousness’ means unchallenged and unanimity (vgl. Alsberg/Nuesse/Meyer, ‘Motion for Proof in a Criminal Trial,’ 5. Aufl. Munich 1983, p.568)
(…) Following statements by history professor Dr. Ernst Nolte are important.
‘Only when the rules of the interrogation of witnesses are generally applied and the testimony of witnesses is no longer evaluated according to political correctness will a secure basis be created for scientific objectivity in regard to the ‘final solution.’
‘The common belief that every doubt about the ‘Holocaust and the six million victims a priori is a mark of a malignant mindset and has to be forbidden, can not be upheld according to the fundamental meaning of the maxim ‘de omnibus dubitandum est everything has to be doubted.’ Science can never accept that and is to be rejected as an attack against the principal of scientific freedom.
The questions regarding the reliability of the testimony of witnesses, the evidence contained in documents, the technical possibilities of certain events, the believability of the given number, the weighing of circumstances, are not only permissible, but necessary for science. Every attempt, by means of silencing or banning of certain arguments and proofs, must be looked upon as illegal.’
‘(…) Questioning the reliability of the witnesses, the veracity of the documents, the technical possibilities of certain events, the believability of the numbers, the weighing of circumstances, is not only permissible, but scientifically necessary. Every attempt to silence or forbid certain arguments and proofs is illegal.’
‘If radical revisionism is right on insisting that there was no holocaust in the sense of an all encompassing genocide authorized by the top echelon then I would have to admit that National Socialism was not a fun house mirror image of Bolshevism, but only a fight for survival by Germany pushed into a worldwide, political defensive.’
‘…It (revisionism) challenges me, but I am nevertheless unable to join those who demand that the prosecutor and the police take action against it. On account of that I feel myself forced to pose the question: does revisionism have valid arguments or does it rest on lying agitation?
And here the quality of the historian comes into play. The historian knows that ‘revisionism’ is the daily bread of science.(…) The historian also knows that, as a rule at the end, some of the revisionist theses will be accepted by the establishment or at least considered in discussions.
By means of silence it is relegated to the ‘memory hole’
During the historian congress not specifically mentioned were the following: during the war and the first years after the war it was maintained that the mass killings were done by means of blowing in hot steam into closed chambers or the killings occurred by means of huge electrified plates, or by means of quick lime. These lies were simply dropped, just like the rumor of the soap from Jewish corpses, which in Germany however was picked up again just recently by an ad in the newspapers paid for by a well known producer. The best known witness report of the member of the confessional church and SS leader Kurt Gerstein has been dropped from the collection of documents by orthodox scholars.
It is also known that Jean-Claude Pressac, in spite of his strange presence and recognition as a serious scholar, has recently reduced the number of victims gassed in the gas chambers of Auschwitz to approximately half a million.
Confessions gotten by torture
These specific corrections are not basically different from the claims which according to my knowledge the revisionists believe in: namely that the first confessions of Hoess, commander of Auschwitz were forced out of him by torture; that the witnessing of flames, sky high, coming from the chimneys of the crematoria must have been due to deluded imagination; that it was technically not possible to cremate daily 24,000 bodies; that the mortuaries which daily registered 300 bodies during typhus epidemics were indispensable and during these periods therefore could not have been used for mass killings.
6 Ernst Nolte, Streitpunkte, Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin 1993 S.308 (Vorlesungen S. 137).
7 Ernst Nolte a.a. O.S.309.
8 Ernst Nolte, Francois Furet, Feindliche Naehe, Herbig, Muenchen 1998 S. 222-224.
9 ‘Atze Brauner, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, May 6, 1995.
Such numbers do not surprise the historian, since he knows from his studies that since the time of Herod gigantic numbers (if they are not recorded as official statistics) are questionable. He also knows that rumors will fly where large crowds of people are finding themselves in extreme situations and experience events difficult to understand.
The statements of Rudolf Hoess, commander of Auschwitz, which without a doubt contributed in a large part to the mental collapse of the accused during the Nuremberg war crime trials, were preceded by torture and therefore, according to the rules of Western civilization, are not legally valid. The Gerstein documents contain so many contradictions and so many impossibilities that they are also without value. The testimony of witnesses rests to the largest part on hearsay and conjecture. The reports partially contradict each other and create doubt as to their believability.
A careful examination after the war by an international expert commission as was performed after the discovery (l943) of the mass graves at Katyn by the German Army did not take place. The blame for this rests on the Soviet and Polish Communists.
The publication of photos of the crematoria and a few cans labeled ‘Zyklon B. poison gas’ are no proof whatsoever since in the larger camps infected by typhus crematoria were a necessity. Since Zyklon B. is a well known vermin killer it can’t be dismissed where there are masses of people living under poor hygienic conditions.
Questions have to be permissible
To question the traditional belief that the mass murder in gas chambers is a ‘manifest obviousness’ proven by countless witnesses and facts has to be permissible, or science is not applicable.
We are dealing with claims which, on the basis of natural science, respectively contain technical impossibilities such as mass murder by means of gas which was not possible and could not have been possible especially to the alleged extent. I am talking here about the chemical analysis of the Cyanide residue in the delousing chambers on one hand and the rooms first planned as mortuaries on the other hand. These expert opinions were written up by Leuchter, Rudolf and Lueftl and last but not least by the extremely thorough studies by Carlo Mattognos who concerned himself with details like time span of incineration, usage of coke, etc. Against the fact that scientifically and technically the mass murder as described was not possible (even if hundreds of confessions and witness reports maintain the opposite), arguments such as these cannot be given credence. In this matter scholars of philosophy and ideology critics are not qualified to have any say.
It is absolutely necessary to discuss the ‘manifest obviousness’ of the ’Holocaust.’ The proof is in the factual and legal article by Fritjof Meyer, a representative of the ‘exterminationists’ who wrote in the year 2002 in the magazine ‘Osteuropa’ in regard to Auschwitz-Birkenau: ‘The genocide did not take place in the concentration camp (Auschwitz-Birkenau), but most likely in two farm houses. (Osteuropa, v. May 2002, pp. 631-641). With this he contradicts witnesses and innumerable statements about Auschwitz-Birkenau. This again points to the fact that there is a need for a discussion about Auschwitz-Birkenau as to the ‘manifest obviousness’ of the place of the crime.
Judges deny elucidation of facts
The court is supposed to freely decide according to its conviction which it should gain from the content of the trial. Without judicial discussion of ‘manifest obviousness’ of the so-called ‘holocaust’ which is not going to be the object of the trial, it remains unclear how lay judges gain their conviction. It is worrisome that their conviction is not based on the content of the trial, but that they let themselves be influenced by outside considerations. This is not only a violation of & 261, but also worrisome bias.
Since factual, meaningful reasoning is neither named nor can be surmised why the ‘manifest obviousness’ of the ‘holocaust’ is not to be discussed the conclusion can only be that an elucidation of facts has to be avoided on account of outside influences. That is not only a serious violation of & 244 II, III StPO, but also an offence against the basic principles of right and justice.
It is worrisome that the lay judges are striving for an outcome of the trial which has nothing to do with trying to elucidate facts.
The refusal to discuss the ‘manifest obviousness’ of the so called ‘Holocaust’ gives rise to the fear that they desire a conviction on the basis that it does not matter to them if the so-called ‘Holocaust’ did or did not take place.
It is worrisome that the lay judges insist on a conviction on the one and only basis namely that the ‘Holocaust’ has been doubted.
This opinion was already articulated by the state court of Mannheim which in the year 2007 convicted Ernst Zuendel. The ‘tageszeitung’ (2/9/2007, p.6) writes about the Zuendel trial: ‘At the end the court denied all motion with the lapidary reasoning (shocking for some antifascists in the audience) that it does not matter if the Holocaust did or did not take place. In Germany its denial is punishable. And it is only that which counts in front of the court.’
It is not enough to simply base a sentencing on the accusation that the so-called ‘Holocaust’ was contested. It is also not enough to sentence the accused for defamation without ascertaining if and how his claim was untrue.
It is a violation of all the principles of justice and a clear case of arbitrariness.
Perpetual pressure for a ‘correct mind set’
It should not be assumed that the lay judges simply set aside the principles for correct procedures due to their own volition, but are subject to and succumbed to the pressure to follow the ‘correct mind set.’ It is for this reason they prevent a discussion about ‘manifest obviousness’ in order to make an effective defense impossible.
The so-called ‘Holocaust’ is not defined in &130, and not even mentioned. It is to be feared that the lay judges convict by disregarding the iron clad principle that in order to punish a deed culpability has to be described and circumscribed by the law beforehand. (Art 103 GG/nulla poena sine lege no punishment without law).
The argument of the lay judges that the ‘manifest obviousness’ of the ‘Holocaust’ needs no discussion because the ‘Holocaust’ is manifestly obvious is a circular argument, and neither logically nor legally tenable. Circular arguments of this kind show clearly the bias of the judges.
The well founded fear that the judges will pronounce a sentence based on bias (as described here) justifies the rejection (of the judges) by the accused on account of bias.
Judges and jurors declared that they harbor no sentiments of bias. (By the way it does not matter if a judge considers himself biased. It does not even matter if he follows a party line or is biased. The application for rejection has to be judged from the point of view of the accused). The very same day, after one sitting, the application for rejection was turned down.
During an intermission the jurors and Guenter Deckert started to talk. The jurors gave him to understand that the application for rejection offended them because they were considered stupid.
We know what kind you are
After that, still on the same day (January 13, 2012), the prosecutor Andreas Grossman had several questions for Guenter Deckert. His aim was to elicit Deckert’s opinion about the ‘Holocaust.’ After his introduction ‘you are the great doubter’ he wanted to know if what’s in the preface of the incriminated book is correct, namely that he (Guneter Deckert ) is neutral to the content of the book. The prosecutor continued with his questioning: was there according to his opinion a state organized genocide of the Jews? Guenter Deckert answered: I am not an arbitrator here. I am not a researcher. I have doubts and my doubts are justified. I fight against the limitation of expressing an opinion.’ ‘What is claimed is technically not possible. THAT is what I say. One must be allowed to express doubts.’ ‘If you give me forensic proofs, I will be the first one who will admit I was mistaken.’
After that the questioning was finished.
The next day of the trial came the final speeches.
Andreas Grossmann exclaimed: Deckert defamed the memory of the dead (&130). It is very clear that the ’Holocaust’ was denied. In his book, Carlo Mattogno writes about the ‘supposed genocide’ and the ‘supposed mass gassings of humans.’ He continues on that the lies have been enshrined in memorials and that there is no historical proof of the first mass gassings in Auschwitz. Without a doubt Carlo Mattogno wanted to deny the ‘Holocaust.’ Guenter Deckert contributed to the book in order that it could appear in Germany. This has been proven by two secured copies.
Guenter Deckert, in the preface of the book, wrote that he is neutral to its content. Judging by his curriculum vitae that is pure hypocrisy. He turned to Deckert: ‘We know what kind you are. Don’t expect us to accept your pretense of distancing yourself from the book.’ He spoke of the vain attempts (by Deckert) to exonerate Germany. You will not be successful. With what you are doing you will only prolong Germany’s disgrace. He (Deckert) is not contrite and not redeemable. One thing you can’t tolerate namely that the Holocaust is an historical fact. Grossmann increased his attack calling Deckert a vainglorious, stubborn, unredeemable holocaust denier.’ Deckert evaded his question as to whether there was a state organized genocide.
Hunt for unwanted literature
In his final defence Guenter Deckert pointed out that the memory of HIS ancestors is continuously defamed. There is no proof (as to the Holocaust). The historical truth is neutral. ‘One must ask: What are the concrete facts. I will not be cowed by cheap arguments. I will not have my rights as a citizen restricted. I do not like to be forced to believe without concrete proofs. Even a prison sentence will not be able to force me.
They talk about tolerance and mean the inquisition. People can be intimidated by the threat of punishment, but only for a certain period of time. The brain continues churning. I am not crawling on account of you … The hunt for unwanted literature is disguised as a fight against crime. … Having doubts I insist on the right to express them. You, Mr. Grossmann believe, because you want to believe. The German people first had to be ‘reeducated’ in order to believe the ‘Holocaust.’ I will gladly admit being in error if you show me proof. Why is there no call for an independent research committee? I am for plurality of opinion … It has always been my motto: Don’t believe if there is no proof. I want to be part of an enlightened state.’
After an interruption of less than an hour the Sentence was pronounced: 6 months without probation. One month was deducted on account of the undue length of the trial.
The main judge, Roos, said in the oral pronouncement ‘that one can be of a different opinion. This has always been the case. Whatever happened here in the state court of Mannheim, the trials against Zuendel, Rudolf or whomsoever, have no bearing on this case. This case deals only with your work on the book by Carlo Mattogno … WE have tried to interpret you correctly. First we hold that &130 is in agreement with the constitution. The problem is that &130 contains innumerable undetermined concepts and interpretations….The Castle Hill publishing house resides in England. There the denial of the Holocaust is not punishable. The special rule of & 9 StGB: participation in crimes committed in foreign countries applies here to you. Maybe this rule would allow for different interpretations. But that is the least of the problem. About disturbing the public peace we can work ourselves into a bind. Let us wait what the higher court decides. This trial was dropped into my lap. I did not want it.
…On one hand you have a right to stick to your convictions. On the other hand you have to count on bearing the consequences of your insistence on staying with your opinion. Mentally you did not distance yourself from your convictions which was obvious during the trial. If you had distanced yourself we could have considered probation. The negative consequence of this trial is that the publicity of the book will be promoted. We have to accept that …and is just as unintelligible as & 130.’
Expressing an opinion is equated with committing a violent action
In its written judgment the chamber justifies not granting probation as follows:
The deed of the accused seriously endangers the public peace, especially in these times of the resurgence of right wing extremism which have been documented by the crimes of the NSU. Since it is obvious from the growing dangers of a resurrected right wing extremism, the chamber holds that these accused have to be fully punished in order to prevent the danger of imitation. Probation for the accused would not go over with the general public and would be considered as an unjustified leniency toward right wing radicalism [The public knows nothing, because there is not a peep in the media about the Deckert trial. C. Miller]’ (p.56 of the appellate court).
That the chamber seriously supports a judgment with such untenable factual and legal arguments points to an arbitrary persecution dictated by foreign interests outside the confines of the trial. It is obvious that the argumentation of the chamber is politically motivated and has nothing to do with justice.
The federal constitutional court made the following decision: The prohibition to spread so-called right wing thoughts lacks defined contours. A position such as right wing extremism depends on the reciprocal effect of changing political and societal contexts and a subjective valuation which does not allow for defining the borders where punishment is justified.
The spreading of right wing and National Socialist thought is not enough for a critique of what is right or wrong or which disallows certain thoughts. (1BVerfG, 1 BvR 1106/08, 12/8/2010, number II 2 b cc(1).
In spite of the fact that this is not a critique of legality, the statement of a politically uncomfortable, so called right wing extremist opinion is categorized as a ‘first step’ to violence. But that is not all. Even an opinion is equated with violence. Guenter Deckert is equated with a murderer in order to justify the denial of probation. With this judgment the chamber ignored the most basic principle of justice.
For a long time they tried to portray so-called right wing extremists (a slogan of the office for the protection of the state) as prone to violence in order to isolate them and to make it easier to persecute them on account of their ‘incorrect’ opinions.
They don’t even hesitate to portray assassins as right wing extremists even if they are declared opponents of National Socialism and supporters of Israel, for example the ‘assassin of Oslo,’ (July, 2011) Anders Behring Breivik, who in the meanwhile has been sentenced.
Gilad Atzmon, Israeli musician, writes on the net under the heading: ‘Was the massacre in Norway a reaction to BDS?’ (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions):’
‘The AUF (Norwegian Worker Party Youth Organization) promoted an Israel-Boycott Campaign (…) Yesterday we learned that the mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik is an openly enthusiastic supporter of Israel (…)Yesterday Gordon Duff wrote in the paper ‘Veterans Today,’ that the car bomb attack’ is marked by an official secret handwriting. (…) In his admiration for Israel Behring Breivik seems to have treated his own countrymen with the same disdain as the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) treat the Palestinians. In a Hebrew article which states that the AUF Camp is pro-Palestinian and supports the Israel boycott, I found among others, the following comments:
24. ‘The Oslo criminals paid.’
26. ‘It is stupid and wicked not to wish death on those who call for a boycott of Israel.’
HYPERLINK ‘http://www.gilad.co.uk/writings/gilad-atzmon-was-the-massacre-in-norway-a-reaction-to-bds.html’ www.gilad.co.uk/writings/gilad-atzmon-was-the-massacre-in-norway-a-reaction-to-bds.html; July 24, 2011.
A manifest by Anders Behring Breivik titled ‘2083’ A European declaration of Independence is supposed to call for: ‘Support Israel’s fight against the Dschihad.’
The mass media however call Andres Behring Breivik a right wing radical. It is another trick commonly used to deceive and to even malign many an Israeli and their supporters as right wing radicals. In this way the establishment hopes to blame violent crimes on national movements in order to discredit them. You could call such an act of perfidy artful, if it weren’t too unbelievable.
They also emphasize that Breivik’s neighbors found him friendly and nondescript.
Such articles are supposed to give people the impression that ‘Nationals’ are violent, brutal, unpredictable, and their friendly behavior is only camouflage.
It is not a new method to malign the opponent as a criminal and to saddle him with having committed murder, in order to effectively eliminate him.
The existence of the so called ‘NSU’ was then and is now unproven. Let me point out that up to now there is neither a proof nor a sentencing in regard of acts of violence of a so-called ‘NSU’ (‘National Socialist Underground.’). The so called ‘Doener murders have not yet been cleared up, and an involvement by the NSU is extremely doubtful. On the other hand the involvement of the ‘Verfasssungschutz’ (protection of the constitution) which shuns the light of day is quite obvious.
From where then does the Mannheimer court get its conviction that the NSU committed crimes?
The two following articles contain only a fraction of facts which refute the unsubstantiated supposition of the Mannheim chamber.
‘Doener’ murder on account of gambling debts?
Turkish press ( HYPERLINK ‘http://www.turkishpress.de/2009/12/12/doener-morde-wegen-wettschulden/id287’ www.turkishpress.de/2009/12/12/doener-morde-wegen-wettschulden/id287) by Fikret Deniz 12/12/2009-18:28.
In the continuing investigation that began in 2000 into the mysterious murder series there might be a possible new trail. In 2007 the Turkish office for criminal investigation reported that a drug war was the cause.
According to ‘Spiegel’ Turkish ‘Ceska’ investigators follow a hunch that the murder of nine men in Germany are connected to betting frauds and postponed football games. But the German BKA did not want to comment on the report on account of the ongoing investigation.
According to ‘Spiegel’ the police, by means of telephone surveillance, found out about a murder in Turkey for which a 42 year old Turkish godfather was named as having given the order. Additional telephone conversations of the circle of the betting mafia about this murder were overheard.
The Turkish office for crimes in 2007 already gave a report which had come to another conclusion.
According to the newspaper ‘Zaman’ of October, 2007 the Turkish state office for criminality gave to the German investigating bureaus their results in regard to the Doener murders. The summary of this report to the German office showed a connection between the Doener murders and the drug scene in Europe which involved a family clan from Diyarbakir. According to the report the eight victims of the ‘Doener murders’ were considered distributors within the drug scene. In addition the victims were supposed to have paid ‘protection money’ to the PKK in Europe and the family clan in Diyarbakir.
The Turkish office for criminality at that time found out that the family clan in Diyarbakir wanted to establish a new distribution ring in Europe. When the hoped for money from the drug scene did not materialize the PKK blackmailed the new distribution ring. The family is supposed to have ordered the murder. The brazenness with which the victims were murdered in broad daylight made one suspect, already then, that it was the handy work of professional killers. The BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) and the Nuremberg police were in the dark, since there were no witnesses or clues. According to the report all murders were committed with three different pistols of the Czech brand Ceska (7.65mm). This report was handed over via the BKA to police chief Wolfgang Geier.
The KOM checked out the 8 victims which were supposed to have been distributors of drugs. The terrorist organization PKK was supposed to have extorted protection money from the victims and in that way tried to take over the drug scene. A successful investigation of the drug scene in Turkey and arrests would have, according to the report, for quite some time seriously hindered the distribution of drugs and curtailed the flow of money. In this phase the family extorted protection money because it wanted to gain a foothold in Europe and build up a new drug ring. The Turkish office of investigation therefore surmised that a drug war had broken out between the PKK and the family clan and that the drug distributors were killed in this war. The Turkish investigators announced that the family clan had commissioned a five member murder commando. The murder itself was always committed by one member of the team with three different pistols of the trade mark Ceska. In this report the name of the murderer and the family clan were revealed and the Nuremberg police informed.
The dubious role of a ‘protector of the constitution’
zeit online, Datum 14.11.2011-20:33 Uhr, @ Uwe Zucchi/dpa.
The investigator of the Neo-Nazi group NSU has a hard time to come up with an explanation. According to a media report a ‘protector of the constitution’ was supposed to have been on location during a murder.
It is possible that an official of the Hessian ‘protection of the constitution’ is more involved in the offence which is supposed to have been committed by the Neo-Nazi-group, National Socialist Underground (NSU). During the murder of a Turkish shop owner in Kassel (April, 2006) the official was supposed to have been seen at the scene of the crime (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung referring to security circles).
Up to now the official story was that the man had left the Internet Cafe that the victim was in one minute before the murder was committed. In the meantime the official has been suspended from his position. According to the report the Kassler prosecutor investigated the ‘protector of the constitution.’ The investigation was discontinued because no connection with the murder could be found. At that time several weapons were supposed to have been found in the apartment of the official. The Turkish shop owner was the last in a murder series of migrants which are blamed on the Neo-Nazi group whose members are supposed to have lived in a mobile home in Eisenach. The Hessian protection for the constitution did not give out any information.
The office for the protection of the constitution considers consequences
In the meantime the office for the protection of the constitution is examining which consequences the case will have on its future work. The office is checking which changes it has to make in regard to the Neo-Nazi-Scene.
The court in Mannheim painted a picture of a criminal NSU using innuendos and thereby subjecting itself to foreign considerations.
The utterance of an opinion, for example the denial of the so called ‘Holocaust,’ meaning the refutation of a mass genocide is equated with assassination and murder.
This is arbitrary. (Does the ‘NSU’ serve the same function for a pretext as ‘9/11’?)
To know and having to believe
The judgment of the appellate court, just like the first judgment, contains no facts about the ‘Holocaust’, not even references to other trials.
The chamber considers Guenter Deckert to be unrepentant (Page 55 of the appellate court) and therefore probation can not be considered. To call Guenter Deckert an unrepentant ‘actor’ along with the accusation of denial of the Holocaust against his better knowledge is a contradiction. The sentencing is therefore contradictory and flawed.
The lack of action against better knowledge is fortified by the determination of the appellate court about the mind set of Guenter Deckert: ‘At the beginning of every scientific debate, and he also considers his own action and also Mattogno’s publication as such, there has to be doubt. Science lives from the exchange of arguments. And that has to be permitted. He wants to know and does not want to be forced to believe. His doubt can be explained by the ad in the Impressum. In all modesty he (Guenter Deckert) cannot judge if Mattagno is right with his objection to Danuta Czech ’scientific opus’’ (p. 48 of the judgment).
The judgment states: ‘The intent of distributing the book is to incite the reader not only against Jews living in Germany and in that way to produce discontent among the people, but more important (what the accused was aware of) he denied that the dead were persecuted, especially the Jews, who had been killed en mass by means of poison gas. This is an offense against the dignity of the Jews.’ That Guenter Deckert wanted to sow dissent in the population and wanted to offend the dignities of the Jews is pure surmise and insinuation on the part of the judges. As was mentioned above no elucidation of the ‘Holocaust’ neither an elucidation of the knowledge of Guenter Deckert was attempted. Mere suspicions cannot be used to the detriment of the accused. (Dreher/Troendle, commentary to the Strafgestzbuch, 46 edition, Muenchen l993. to&46 Rn 17a).
‘The action of Guenter Deckert, denial of the Holocaust, contrary to historical truth, is defamation, especially of the Jews’ (p. 53 of the sentencing).
Since in the course of the whole trial no concrete facts regarding the historical truth of the Holocaust were brought forth nor communicated not even in reference to other judgments a sentencing for defaming the memory of the dead is not legal.
Manifest obviousness is unsupported
The OLG Karlsruhe denied revision of Guenter Deckert’s case as having no merit (August, 2012) (349 Abs. 2 StPO) (3 (4) Ss304/12-AK126/12).
The constitutional court of the BRD did not accept and made no decision concerning the complaint citing the constitution (basic law December 12, 2012 1 BvR 1891/12). No reason was given. According to & 93 d Abs. 1 Satz 3 BVerfGG non-acceptence does not have to be justified.
Guenter Deckert’s motion to repeat the trial has not yet been looked at.
Guenter Deckert was ordered to start his sentence January 2, 2013 at the prison in Mannheim.
For every logical, thinking and honest person it is obvious that Guenter Deckert’s sentence rests on many arbitrary decisions. His sentence is based on illegality and has no merits.
A female judge of the former DDR was convicted on account of bending the law: ‘This is not justice, but arbitrary suppression, aimed to eliminate a political opponent. The type of punishment does not agree with factual considerations. Its recognizable aim is to intimidate politically incorrect thinkers and thereby secure the rule of the present power elite.’ Object of the sentence which the judge pronounced, was an undesired opinion and was therefore penalized (news of the BVerfG Nr 41/98 , April 22, l998, BVerfG 2 BvR 2560/95).
Sylvia Stolz, excluded from the law profession on account of ‘Holocaust denial’.
Pfarrer Grabmeier-Allee 10, 85560
Email: [email protected]